PRINT DATE: 04/09/98

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FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE NUMBER:05-6-2920 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION & CONTROL

REVISION: 0

04/09/98

		KEVISION: U	04/09/96
	PA	RT DĀTA	
	PART NAME	PART NUMBER	
•	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMB	ER
LRU	:FPCA-1	VO70-7633X0	
LRŲ	:FPCA-2	VO70-7633X0	
SRU	:RESISTOR	RWR80\$1211FR	

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

RESISTOR, WIRE WOUND, 1,21K, 2W - EMU POWER SUPPLY/BATTERY CHARGER BUS SELECT CONTROL CIRCUIT

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS:

81V76A25R27

82V76A26R89

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 2

(TWQ)

FUNCTION:

CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR. PROTECTS THE CONTROL INPUT OF RPC37, RPC47, RPC52, AND RPC40 FOR THE EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT (EMU) 1 OR 2 POWER SUPPLY AND BATTERY CHARGER BUS SELECT CONTROL UNIT.

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS:

1) V570-960099, INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC - 60DF1, AECS EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT/EXT AIRLOCK

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA - CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 05-6-2920-02

REVISION#: 0 04/09/98

SUBSYSTEM NAME: ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION & CONTROL

LRU: FPCA-1 OR FPCA-2 CRITICALITY OF THIS ITEM NAME: RESISTOR: FAILURE MODE: 1R3

FAILURE MODE:

FAILS SHORT (END TO END)

MISSION PHASE:

OO ON-ORBIT

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102 COLUMBIA 103 DISCOVERY 104 ATLANTIS

105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

A) STRUCTURAL FAILURE (MECHANICAL STRESS, VIBRATION), B) CONTAMINATION, C) ELECTRICAL STRESS, D) THERMAL STRESS, E) PROCESSING ANOMALY

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

CRITICALITY 1R2 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY (AVIONICS ONLY)? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) FAIL

B) FAIL C) PASS

PASSIFAIL RATIONALE:

A)

SCREEN "A" FAILS BECAUSE THERE IS NO PROCEDURE TO DETECT THE RESISTOR FAILING SHORT (END TO END) DURING NORMAL GROUND TURNAROUND WITH NO VEHICLE DESIGN MODIFICATION.

E)
SCREEN "B" FAILS BECAUSE RESISTOR FAILING SHORT (END TO END) IS NOT READILY............
DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT.

Ç)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) — CIL FAILURE MODE NUMBER: 05-6-2920-02

LOSS OF ABILITY TO LIMIT CURRENT FROM THE CONTROL BUS DUE TO A DOWNSTREAM FAULT.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT

(C) MISSION:

FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWIVEHICLE AFTER THREE FAILURES:

- 1) RESISTOR FAILS SHORT (END TO END) LOSS OF ABILITY TO LIMIT THE CURRENT DRAWN FROM THE ASSOCIATED CONTROL BUS DUE TO A DOWNSTREAM ELECTRICAL FAULT.
- 2) SWITCH CONTACT SHORTS TO STRUCTURE (GROUND) DOWNSTREAM OF RESISTOR TYING AFFECTED CONTROL BUS AB1 (BC1) TO GROUND RESULTING IN LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. BOTH EMU POWER CONNECTIONS LOSE THE CAPABILITY TO BE CONNECTED TO ONE OF TWO MAIN BUSES. LOSS OF ONE CONTROL BUS.
- LOSS OF SECOND CONTROL BUS LOSS OF CONTROL POWER NECESSARY FOR THE OPERATION OF CRITICAL LOADS (REF. FMEA 05-6-2132-1).

- TIME FRAME -

TIME FROM FAILURE TO CRITICAL EFFECT: N/A

TIME FROM FAILURE OCCURRENCE TO DETECTION: N/A

TIME FROM DETECTION TO COMPLETED CORRECTING ACTION: N/A

IS TIME REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTING ACTION LESS THAN TIME TO EFFECT?

RATIONALE FOR TIME TO CORRECTING ACTION VS TIME TO EFFECT:

DESIGN FAULT TOLERANCE: THREE FAILURES ARE REQUIRED BEFORE THE LOSS OF THE SECOND CONTROL BUS REQUIRED FOR THE OPERATION OF CRITICAL LOADS.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

REFER TO APPENDIX E, ITEM NO. 3 - RWR80 RESISTOR

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE NUMBER: 05-6-2920-02

(B) TEST:

REFER TO APPENDIX E, ITEM NO. 3 - RWR80 RESISTOR

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST
ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT TESTING IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

REFER TO APPENDIX E, ITEM NO. 3 - RWR80 RESISTOR

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURES, FLIGHT FAILURES, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATA BASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

NONE

- APPROVALS -

SS&PAE SS&PAE MANAGER DESIGN ENGINEERING

DESIGN ENGINEERING BNA SSM

JSC MOD

: T. K. KIMURA L: P. A. STENGER

: D. D. SOVEREIGN

: R. L. PHAN

J. Kemure 4-9-98

10, 5 over 541-18

R. Man 4-9-38 B. Da mer 4/D/99